In this article, we examine the relation between corporate governance and institutional ownership. The study sample contained 98.5% of Kuwait's financial sector corporations, which are listed in Kuwait Stock Exchange and which are 66 Corporations during 2010. The descritive results indicated that there is an average application, which was statically significant to the corporate governance conditions in Kuwait's financial sector. The empirical results indicate that the fraction of a company's shares, held by institutional investors, decreases with the quality of its governance structure. These results are not consistent with the conjecture that institutional investors gravitate to stocks of companies with good governance structure.
INTRODUCTION
-192 -We define institutional ownership as the fraction of a firm's shares, held by institutional investors. Hence, by definition, institutional ownership of a company is the fraction of its shares, held by non-institutions (i.e., individual investors). If we were to examine institutional investors' preference towards a certain group of companies, we would consider why institutional investors' preference for those companies is likely to be greater than that of individual investors. Institutional investors (e.g., banks, insurance companies and pension funds) have strong fiduciary responsibilities. Del Guercio (1996) indicates that many institutional investors tilt their portfolios to stocks, viewed as prudent investments. Grinstein and Michaely (2005) suggest that institutions avoid firms which do not pay dividends, because a "prudent" stock should have a history of stable dividend payments. Because investors in poorly governed companies are likely to face large risks of expropriation and other self-dealing problems, they may not earn fair rates of return or may even fail to preserve the invested capital (i.e., fail to meet the prudent-person rule). Hence, institutional investors' fiduciary responsibilities give them a strong incentive to choose stocks of companies with a good governance structure (Chung & Zhang, 2011) .
In short, we conjecture that institutional investors are more likely to prefer stocks of better-governed companies than individual investors are because bettergoverned companies are likely to require less monitoring, have higher stock market liquidity, and more easily, meet fiduciary responsibilities. In what follows, we test our conjecture by examining whether a firm's institutional ownership increases with its governance quality.
The paper is organized as follows: Section II is for background and literature review. Section III describes research design and methodology. Section IV presents empirical results. Section V provides a brief summary and concluding remarks.
Background and Literature Review:
Corporate Governance in Kuwait:
Corporate governance practice has recently become an important topic across over the world, specifically within the emerging stock markets in order to avoid expropriation by corporate management at the expense of minority shareholders. Although corporate governance is considered to be tremendously important in many countries, whether developed or developing, 
Corporate
Governance and Institutional
Ownership:
Corporate governance has been a subject of numerous studies during the last two decades. Williamson (1985) and Grossman and Hart (1986) hold that managerial opportunism reduces the amount of capital that investors are willing to contribute to the firm. Shleifer & Vishny (1997) note that corporate governance deals with various constraints that either managers put on themselves or investors put on managers to reduce the agency problem. Gompers, Ishii, and Metrick(2003) indicate that better corporate governance leads to greater firm values and higher stock returns. Chung, et al. (2010) determine that better governance results in higher stock market liquidity (Chung & Zhang, 2011 ROA i : is a continuous variable: is the ratio of net income to the book value oftotal assets, for the company (i).
ε i : random error.
Measuring of variables
The selection of variables is based on an examination of previous empirical studies, table 2 shows the dependent variable, the independent variables, in terms of corporate governance, and the control variables employed for all estimated models of the study. 
Control variables:
Company size CSize Natural log of total assets.
Financial leverage Leverage
The ratio of total debt to total assets.
Shares trading Turnover
Is the average ratio of trading volume to the number of shares outstanding. All the variables on the right side express non-random variables excluding the last one ε i , 1 which is supposed to belong to the natural distribution with a zero average and a fixed variance is expressed in σ2 1 . All these variables are independent ones. As for the variable "InstOwnership"
there is dependent in the model and have the same probability random error ε i,1 with a variance of σ2 1 and the average is: The study perform the Student's t-test and Wilcoxon test to determine whether the mean value of institutional ownership for corporations, belonging to the highest governance-index quintile is statistically different from the corresponding value for corporations that belong to the lowest governance-index quintile. The results indicate that the difference in the mean institutional ownership between the two quintiles is statistically significant at the 5% level.
To determine whether the relation between institutional ownership and corporate governance varies across different types of institutions, we repeat the previous analysis, using data for each of the following five types of institutions. The results indicate that corporations with lower governanceindex exhibit greater institutional ownerships across all types of institutions. For instance, for Type 1 institutions (banks), the mean institutional holdings of firms that belong to the lowest governance-index quintile is 38.7% whereas the corresponding figures for firms that belong to the highest governance-index quintile is 0.0%. The difference in the mean institutional ownership between the two quintiles is statistically significant at the 5% level.
Regression Results:
In this section, we examine how institutional ownership is related to corporate governance after controlling for other variables determinants of institutional ownership.
Corporate Governance and Institutional Ownership:
The main hypothesis tests the impact of the corporate governance characteristics on enhancement the institutional ownership in Kuwait's financial sector. In testing this hypothesis Ordinary Least Squares OLS test was used. 
Summary, Concluding and Recommendations:
The Cadbury Committee defines corporate governance as a system which guides and controls corporations. Corporate governance is one of the important factors in improving efficacy of economic (Mousavi, et al., 2012, p. 192 (Wahab et al., 2008) .
In this study, we examine the role of good corporate governance in attracting the institutional investors in (66) corporations in the financial sector in Kuwait stock exchange. 
